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DOS REVIEWED 12-Jan-2011: NO OBJECTION TO RELEASE AS SANITIZED

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A. (C/NFU) AT DINNER PARTY 26 JULY 74, AND DURING MEETING ON 27 JULY 74 25x1 RU HE HAS HEARD THAT THE FOLLOWING CHANGES IN THE SOVIET MILITARY LEADERSHIP ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION: (1) GRECHKO WILL GIVE UP HIS POSITION AS MOD BUT WILL REMAIN ON THE POLITBURG.
(2) TOLUBKO WILL MOVE FROM CHIEF OF ROCKET FORCES TO RECOME MOU. (3) KULIKOV WILL HOVE FROM CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF TO REPLACE YAKUBOVSKIY AS CINC WARSAW PACT FORCES. SOURCE HAD NOT HEARD WHO WILL REPLACE KULIKOV, BUT SPECULATED IT MIGHT BE OGARKOV. SOURCE DID NOT KNOW WHAT HOULD HAPPEN TO YAKUBOVSKIY. (4) IVANOVSKIY WILL MOVE FROM CINC GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES, GERMANY TO REPLACE PAVLOSKIY AS CINC GROUND FORCES.
PAVLOVSKIY WILL THEN MOVE TO CHIEF INSPECTORATE. B. (C/NFU) 25x1 DECLINED TO SAY WHERE HE HAD GOT HIS
INFORMATION WHETHER HIS SOURCE WAS SOVIET. WHEN PRESSED FOR INFO ON WHEN CHANGES WERE TO TAKE PLACE, HE WOULD ONLY SAY "NOT IMMEDIATELY, BUT SOON."
C. (C/NFD) WHEN RO COMMENTED THAT MOVING FROM CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF TO CINC WARSAW PACT FORCES APPEARED TO BE A STEP DOWN FOR KULIKOV, 25x1 POINTED OUT THAT BOTH POSITIONS CARRY TITLE OF FIRST DEPUTY MOD AND STATED THAT HE DIO NOT CONSIDER ONE LESS PRESTIGIOUS THAN THE OTHER. WHEN RO INSISTED THAT KULIKOV APPEARED TO BE IN A BETTER POSITION THAN TOLUBKO FOR BECOMING MOD, 25x1 THAT REGARDLESS OF APPEARANCES TOLUBKO WAS THE ONE IN LINE FOR THE JOB AND THAT IF HE ACTUALLY BECAME MOD IT WOULD INDICATE EVEN GREATER PRIMACY FOR THE STRATEGIC ROCKET
D. (C/NFD) 25x1 THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY TALKED TO OGARKOV AND THAT HE WAS GREATLY IMPRESSED BY HIS INTELLIGENCE. HE ALSO COMMENTED THAT HE WAS ONE OF THE FEW SOVIET GENERAL OFFICERS WHO WOULD TALK TO A FOREIGNER ON SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS.
COMMENT (C,NFD): (1) THERE IS NO WAY OF ASSESSING VALIDITY OF INFO PROVIDED 25x1 BUT RO IS CONVINCED THAT 25x1 BELIEVES IT. SOURCE SEEMED PARTICULARLY CONFIDENT THAT TOLUBKO WILL ACCED TO MOD POSITION. IF TOLUBKO IS SELECTED FUR THIS POSITION AHEAD OF KULIKOV, HIS PROMOTION MAY INDEED SIGNAL STILL

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GREATER IMPORTANCE FOR THE STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES AND BE AN INDICATION OF SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES TO THIS TYPE OF ARMED FORCES. KULIKOV MAY MISS THIS PROMOTION SIMPLY BY REASON OF NOT HAVING HAD AN ADEQUATE BACKGROUND IN THE FIELD WHICH IS CURRENTLY RECEIVING THE GREATEST EMPHASIS.

ON BALANCE NONE OF THE CHANGES INDICATED 25x1 ARE UNREASONABLE. THERE HAVE BEEN INDICATIONS THAT POLITBURO DUTIES HAVE PLACED HEAVY DEMAND ON GRECHKO'S TIME. IT WOULD NOT BE UNEXPECTED IF HE WERE TO RELINQUISH HIS MOD PORTTION. KULIKOVIS BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE SHOULD QUALIFY HIM IDEALLY AS CINC WARSAN PACT FORCES. ALTHOUGH PAVLOSSKIY SEEMS A LITTLE YOUNG FOR RELEGATION TO THE GENERAL INSPECTORATE, THERE MAYBE OTHER REASONS FOR SUCH A MOVE WHICH WE DO NOT KNOW ABOUT. IVANOVSKIY, OF COURSE, IS WELL QUALIFIED AND A KNOWN "COMER." TOLUBKO HAS BEEN LARGELY AN UNKNOWN FACTOR. BUT WITHOUT QUESTION HE IS HIGHLY REGARDED. ONE OVERALL EFFECT OF THESE PERSUNNEL CHANGES WOULD BE TO SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE AVERAGE AGE OF THE TOP MILITARY LEADERSHIP. THIS WOULD BE AN EXTENSION OF WHAT APPEARS TO BE AN ALREADY ESTABLISHED POLICY. MOST EVIDENT IN THE APPOINTMENT OF YOUNG MILITARY DISTRICT COMMANDERS, AND A YOUNG CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF.

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